Попасть в ворота дока гораздо сложнее, чем в палубу линкора. Инфраструктуру бомбить никто и не пытался.

While commanding the First Air Fleet, Nagumo oversaw the attack on Pearl Harbor, but he was later criticized for his failure to launch a third attack,[6] which might have destroyed the fuel oil storage and repair facilities. This could have rendered the most important U.S. naval base in the Pacific useless, especially as the use of the submarine base and intelligence station at the installation were critical factors in Japan's defeat in the Pacific War

Nagumo had absolutely no idea where the American carriers were, and remaining on station while his forces looked for them ran the risk of his own forces being found first and attacked while his aircraft were absent searching. In any case, insufficient daylight remained after recovering the aircraft from the first two waves for the carriers to launch and recover a third before dark, and Nagumo's escorting destroyers lacked the fuel capacity to loiter long. Much has been made of Yamamoto's hindsight, but in keeping with Japanese military tradition not to criticize the commander on the spot,[17] he did not punish Nagumo for his withdrawal

Целями для 1-й ударной группы 1-й ударной волны были в порядке приоритета: линкоры, авианосцы, тяжёлые крейсера