One important characteristic of Lycan’s use of the term [qualia] is an empirically very plausible claim, namely, that simple sensory content can also be causally activated and causally active without an accompanying episode of conscious experience corresponding to it. The logical subjects for the ascription of first-order phenomenal properties are, for Lycan, intentionally inexistents in a Brentanoian sense. My own intuition is that, strictly speaking, neither phenomenal properties nor phenomenal individuals—if real or intentionally inexistent—exist. What do exist are holistic, functionally integrated complexions of subcategorical content, active feature detectors episodically bound into a coherent microfunctional whole through synchronization processes in the brain. I have called such integrated wholes “phenomenal holons” (Metzinger 1995b). In describing them as individuals and by then “attaching” properties to them we import the ontology underlying the grammar of natural language into another, and much older, representational system. For this reason, it might be possible that no form of abstract analysis which decomposes phenomenal content into an individual component (the logical subject) and the property component (the phenomenal properties ascribed to this logical subject) can really do justice to the enormous subtlety of our target phenomenon. Possibly the grammar of natural languages just cannot be mapped onto the representational deep structure of phenomenal consciousness. All we currently know about the representational dynamics of human brains points to an “internal ontology” that does not know anything like fixed, substantial individuals or invariant, intrinsic properties.